Abstract. A scheme for ensuring access rights untransferability in a client-server ecenario with a central authority and where servers hold no access information about clients is presented in this paper; an extension to a multi-authority scenario is conceivable, since servers are also authority independent. Usurping a right with no information at all about other clients is for a client as hard as the discrete logarithm, and rights sharing between clients does not compromise their non-shared rights aa long as MA confidentiality holds. Transferring rights between clients without the authority's contribution cannot be done unless M A confidentiality is broken; however, only control on partial rights transfers is addressed in this paper, which does not deal with totalidentity transfer or alienation.
Introduction
In a distributed computing system, the entities that require identification are hosts, users and processes -see [Woo 92 ][Linn 901 for a more detailed framework. When one of those entities requests a service from another entity, we will use the term client to denote the first entity, and the term s e w e r to denote the second entity. A server will provide the requested service only after checking that the would-be client possesses a &gbt to obtain that service from him.
Consider a typical distributed scenario consisting of a large network with a central authority, a set of servers giving access to certain resources, and a community of clients. Clients are granted rights by the authority, and servers need only a certified list of available access rights in order to perform access control. Servers store no access information about clients, neither access lists nor capabilities, and thus the authority is able to perform client registration, rights granting and rights revocation independently of servers; in addition, the latter two are public operations. Finally, it is also thinkable that servers do not depend on the authority, i. e., that they store no confidential information about the authority.
Keeping no access information in the servers is not common in conventional a c c a control schemes such as [Harr 761 or [Grah 721, so that server control on the rights transfers between clients -like the one implemented with copy flags in the [Harr 761 version of the acceaa matrix model-is not feasible. Now the 261 question is: How to achieve rights untransferability in a scenario where servers are client-independent? Remark 1. Note that if servers are trusted and client-dependent, i.e. if they hold some kind of access matrix exclusively updated by an authority, then the authority can trivially enforce untransferability by just having each client request checked by the servers against the client's rights in the access matrix. So, no right can be successfully transferred without the authority's contribution.o
The mechanism presented in this article fulfills all the requirements of the distributed scenario above, with the only additional constraint that servers be able to securely hold a private RSA key. The degree of security is such that -Usurping a right with no information at all about other clients is for a client aa hard as solving a discrete logarithm.
-As long as MA confidentiality holds, rights sharing between clients does not compromise their non-shared rights.
-Aa long as RSA confidentiality holds, for a client to transfer some of her rights to another client, the transfer must be performed by the authority.
Remark 2. Our primary goal is to prevent a client cc from unauthorisedly transferring some of her rights to another client el. Notice that it is always possible for Ck to completely reveal her identity to CI, so that C I could use all rights belonging to cc, by impersonating her. The problem of total identity transfer or alienation will not be dealt with here; this pohcsibility always exits because in our context ck's identity consists of a secret number Ok owned by Ck and Only shared with the authority.0
The initial assumptions for the scheme are listed in section 2. Section 3 contains the scheme itself along with a theorem on security when a client has no information at all about other clients. Section 4 asaeeses the r i s b of rights sharing.
Untransferability is dealt with in section 5, where an algorithm to perform rights transfers with the authority's contribution is given as well. Finally, section 6 contains a functional summary and an extension of the system for a scenario with several authorities.
Initial Setting
Definitionl. A server is said to be client-independent if it does not store p r e tected access information about its potential clients (neither access lists nor capabilities).
As it was pointed out above, client independence allows the authority to register clients, as well as granting and revoking rights to them without having to communicate secretly with every server.
Consider two public numbers p and a, with p a large prime and a a generator of 2/@)'. Take p > (mn) ' , where rn is the number of clients and n is the number of rights. 
Definition2. Let E e ,~( )
and &N() be the usual RSA encryption and decryp tion functions, such that &,&) = f mod N and Dd,N(y) = y" mod N.
The Identification Scheme
The mathematical structure used is a modification of the one described in [Domi 911: thanks to the use of MA, the scheme becomes much simpler, but also dependent on the difficulty of factoring and on the servers securely storing a private RSA key. The algorithm in [Domi 911 relies solely on the discrete logarithm problem, but does not address untransferability.
Let Auth be the central network authority. In the presence of several clients co,...,c,-l a way must be found to be able to grant the same right to more than one client, while keeping a single numerical expression y for it (the rights are also client-independent). Algorithm 1 gives a solution to this problem. Let us make some definitions before giving the algorithm.
Define n k as the number of rights to be granted to client C k , for k = 0 to rn -1. Also, assuming that rights are granted first to C O , then to c1 and so on, let t k be the number of rights, among the n k to be granted to C k , that have already been granted to some client in {CO 
Give the numbers Z k ; , & , N ( r k , )
, 0 5 i 5 n k -1 to C k an a public way.
Give the number U k t o Ck in a confidential way.
It is possible to publicly give a right y k n k = ax'"* m o d p to a client c k having rights y k , = aZk. mod p , 0 5 i 5 n k -1 and a secret number Q k . This is straightforward since, according to the previous algorithm, it is possible for the authority to pick a random rknk over 2 / ( p -1) and compute an integer the resulting Z k n k , E e , N ( r k n k ) are given in a public way to the client and the procedure is finished.
A way to perform rights revocation is for the authority Auth to publish a new certified rights list; then Auth also publishes the new numbers Z k , , E c ,~( r k , ) corresponding to the rights y k , which are maintained for each client C k .
Bearing the above in mind, the following result holds for each client c k %k,, E 2/(p -such that x k n k + r k m k = (1k%knk mod (p -1). After this, Proof. client c k supplies the server with integers Ak(# 1) and % k , , E k , ( # o), for i = 0, . . . , n k -1, satisfying the following set of equations Now if c ) is able to prove her knowledge of log, A t over 2 / ( p -l), then the server can check that, if Ck knew his key, she could express the y k , ' s as powers of a, i. e . that c k could obtain the logarithms of the y k , ' S for i = 0 to 111--1. Notice that c k has been given a k in the last step of algorithm 1, and it is straightforward from equations 1 that Ak := a"* mod N satisfies equations 2 when for all E k . ' s it holds that Ek, = E e , N ( r k , ) and the same % k , ' s are used in both systems. Now
Protocol 1 or 2 of [Chau 881 can be used to show possession of the logarithm of Ak in zero knowledge. As for security, equations 2 are verifiable by the server since the yi's are public and certified for 0 5 i 5 n k -1. Assume that Ck does not own a particular y k , but has invented or obtained the corresponding random number r k , (see equations 1); now if c k is able to compute by herself a number Zk, satisfying the i-th equation 2, then c k is able to solve the discrete logarithm problem of finding x k , . On the other hand, if Ck invents Z k , and manages to compute then a matching r k , , then c k is also able to solve the discrete logarithm problem of finding Z k , .
The proof is now complete and the server has needed no particular previous information about client C k . Also, the construction can be applied to a subset of the y k , ' s if the client does not wish to prove all of them.QED Proof. When clients C k and cr share a right g i , they are not likely to share a left-hand side of any of equations 1, since each logarithm zi has been added a random number. The probability of randomly picking different rk, over 2 / ( p -1) for all m clients and n rights is How Dangerous Is Rights Sharing?
which approaches unity if p -1 >> (mn)*.
Ck and cr share a right yi results from equations 1 and is So, the only equality in terms of the exponents that can be established when 
But even if C k knows a! (collusion with cr), Ck ignores zi, because her own El;, is an encrypted random number. On the other hand, in order for a server to believe that c1 possesses yi, a raised to the second term on the left-hand side of equation 4 times yi must coincide with a raised to the right-hand side over Z / ( p ) . So 
